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Abstract 
Primary healthcare in Australia is vulnerable to a multitude of information security threats and insecure 
practices. This situation is increasingly important in the developing e-health environment. Information security is 
everyone’s responsibility and it is extensively documented in international standards and best practice 
frameworks, that this responsibility should be part of formal job descriptions. This necessitates incorporation of 
security at a functional level for all staff. These responsibilities are integral to demonstrable accountability, 
together with an authority to take action.  Indeed, whilst senior management will ultimately be held accountable, 
staff need to be aware of the potential issues, given the responsibility to be vigilant, and the authority to act when 
information security issues arise. This is pertinent within Australian primary healthcare where the accountability 
for information security is most often devolved to the role of the practice manager.  This paper analyses 
information security accountability from an operational and strategic security capability viewpoint in terms of 
responsibility and authority. Further, it discusses this in regard to the associated information security 
governance perspective. In the trustful primary healthcare environment, the accountability for information 
security resides with operational level staff who have many competing aspects to their role. The paper suggests 
how to manage this layer of security without burdening the already busy practice manager.  
Keywords 
Information security governance; healthcare security; governance capability; accountability; general medical 
practice; CMM.  
INTRODUCTION 
General practices are usually the first point of contact for people requiring health related care (RACGP, 2005). 
General practitioners may refer patients onto specialists or hospitals for further expert medical treatment when 
required. Further, hospitals discharge patients into the long-term care of their general practitioner. As such, 
general practices are involved in a high percentage of the information exchanges that occur to support the 
continuation of patient care (NEHTA, 2006). 
Information security threats have evolved with 90% of threats now targeting confidential information (Symantec, 
2009). The primary motivation of cybercriminals is financial gain either by accessing electronic financial 
information from a computer system or by stealing personal electronic information with the intent of committing 
identity theft (Symantec, 2009). Internet enabled general medical practices are vulnerable to the same range of 
security threats and vulnerabilities as are large organisations, but they often lack the equivalent financial and 
human resources to address information security in the same manner. Access to information when it is needed at 
the point of care is vital in healthcare, as it has the potential to impact on human health and lives. Incorporating 
information security governance into general practice could promote improvement in information security 
practice.   
Information security governance is considered to be part of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
governance (IT Governance Institute, 2007), which itself is a key area of corporate governance (Pironti, 2007). 
However, within healthcare, ICT governance does not form part of clinical governance, the healthcare equivalent 
of corporate governance. Clinical governance includes clinical audit, education and training, research and 
development, risk management, openness and clinical effectiveness (Starey, 2001). Therefore, implementation of 
governance activities such as accountability, are not new to general practice. 
The Information Security Governance (ISG) capability framework presented in this paper extends available 
technical best practice information security management (ISM) audits by focusing on the human activities 
applicable to information security and compliance within general medical practice. An important distinction 
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needs to be drawn between information security management best practice frameworks such as ISO\IEC 27002 
and information security governance. This paper addresses governance capability and accountability for 
information security within general medical practice. Further, the work presented is an application of the 
capability maturity model (CMM) technique for information security governance. 
GOVERNANCE CAPABILITY 
Capability is “the measure of the ability of an entity (department, organisation, person, system) to achieve its 
objectives” (Business Dictionary, 2011). Governance capability is defined as the measure of ability of practice 
staff to implement information security governance within the practice in order to meet the practice objectives. 
Where operational capability is largely technical in nature and therefore the responsibility of the ICT 
officer/contractor, governance capability is a human endeavour and is the responsibility of designated staff. 
To determine governance capability within general medical practice, an information security governance 
capability framework was developed from the literature (ISO, 2005; CobiT, 2007; NIST, 2003; COSO, 2005). 
Table 1 lists the eleven areas of information security governance capability that form the general structure of this 
framework, and maps these to the governance objectives of Accountability, Resource Management and Future 
Orientation. Further, the table assigns staff roles within a primary healthcare practice that are associated with this 
responsibility, authority and accountability.  
 
Table 16: Mapping responsibility, authority and accountability to the                                                                
Information Security Governance Capability Framework 
Information Security  Governance 
Capability Framework 
Responsibility Authority Accountability 
Accountability – Aligning information security activities in support of general practice objectives 
1. Strategic Alignment Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner Practice  Owner 
2. Roles and Responsibilities All Staff Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
3. Policies All Staff Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
4. Compliance All Staff Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
2. Resource Management– Optimising investments in support of the practice objectives 
5. Asset Management Practice 
Manager 
Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
6. Information Management All Staff Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
7. People Management Practice 
Manager 
Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
8. Financial Management  Practice 
Manager 
Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
3. Future Orientation– Appropriate measures to manage risks and potential impacts to an 
acceptable level 
9. Risk Management  Practice 
Manager 
Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
10. Incident Reporting All Staff Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
11. Business Continuity Management Practice 
Manager 
Practice 
Manager 
Practice  Owner 
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This governance capability framework has, in addition to the eleven functional areas, sixty associated 
governance capability measures (not shown). The mapping in Table 1 was developed by taking each category of 
the governance capability process – accountability, resource management, future orientation – and for each of 
the eleven functional areas assigning the person(s) with the relevant responsibility for the function, authority to 
undertake and effect the function, and the person(s) with the accountability for the function.  This table 
highlights the importance of all staff having a role to play in the information security governance process, and 
not just those with ultimate accountability as is generally thought. Accountability for information security 
governance, such as legal or regulatory compliance, ultimately rests with the practice owners, however, the 
Practice Manger is largely left to implement and manage the security tasks as is indicated in the table in the 
responsibility and authority columns. An understanding of governance roles as they relate to specific aspects of 
governance capabilities is therefore required.   
Accountability 
Accountability for information security must be shared by all employees (von Solms & von Solms, 2004; 
Brotby, 2009). The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) has incorporated eleven control objectives of information 
security governance in their CobiT benchmarking model (ICT Governance, 2007). As such, information security 
governance is not seen by CobiT as a separate process to ICT governance, and all information processes are 
strategically aligned with the businesses’ goals and objectives (Poole, 2006; ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). 
Accountability is also part of both clinical and corporate governance systems (Starey, 2001) and proper 
information security governance structure is essential (von Solms & von Solms, 2004). 
The diversity of competing factors in the healthcare environment indicates that information security in practice is 
a complex issue. It is known that a culture of trust is inherent in healthcare environments and this directly affects 
policy formulation, creates confidence in staff to maintain confidentiality and privacy, and to implement security 
measures correctly without scrutiny (Williams, 2008b, 2009). Studies have found that trust in the healthcare 
environment is driven by group values as well as the trust motivation between individuals thus the creation of a 
strong trust culture (Zakaria, Stanton & Stam, 2003). In this regard, staff within general practice trust that 
information security has been adequately addressed by appropriate staff, yet it is not sufficiently communicated 
or measured across all staff functions.  
The framework demonstrates how governance responsibility and authority for information security can be 
designated to practice staff thereby assisting the practice manager in managing information security. By having 
an information security governance strategy and training staff to be aware of information security threats to the 
practice, staff can be given the authority to act in mitigating threats. If this takes place, or is already in existence, 
then incorporating assessment of the capability of the practice to implement this is required.   
MEASURING GOVERNANCE CAPABILITY 
Developed in the late 1980s, Capability Maturity Model (CMM) was devised to drive and guide improvement 
through the appraisal of internal and external organisational processes (Galin and Avrahami, 2006). Thus, CMM 
provides a logical progression from ad hoc process implementation to regimented and definite process execution. 
In this manner it is possible to use CMM to assess and measure process areas for identification of weaknesses in 
organisational operations and practices (Hopkinson, 2001). Further, the CMM approach has been demonstrated 
to be an integral part of CobiT, an ICT governance framework. (Brothby, 2009, pg 10). The success factors in 
the use of CMM have been shown to be positively related to planning and tracking of activities. Amongst the 
suite of CMM derivatives are those relating to medical practice security.   
Research conducted by Williams (2008a) demonstrated the feasibility of using a Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) approach to benchmarking levels of operational information security within general medical practice. 
“When implementing the operational [CMM] framework, each process for a given activity can be addressed 
individually for contribution to a level above. This means that improvements can be incremental and competency 
can be tracked using the specified criteria” (Williams, 2008a). It is therefore proposed that CMM is likewise a 
suitable approach to measure information security governance capability.  
As defined by Williams (2008a) the CMM assessment levels that are applicable to the medical environment for 
practical application are defined in Table 2.  These levels are the basis for the CMM levels as defined in the 
application in Table 3.  
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CMM Level Operational Focus  
5 Optimizing Best practices are followed and automated 
4 Managed Processes are monitored and measured 
3 Defined Processes are documented and communicated 
2 Repeatable Processes follow a regular pattern 
1 Initial Processes are ad hoc and disorganised.  
Table 2: General characteristics of CMM (Williams, 2008a) 
Whilst CMM can be somewhat “imprecise and subjective, it does however, provide a straightforward intuitive 
approach that most staff would find sufficiently easy to apply” (Brothby, 2009, pg 10). The benefit of the CMM 
approach therefore is that general practice staff without ICT training are likely to find the approach to measuring 
governance easily understandable. 
Table 3 below develops an example using one of the eleven information security governance framework areas 
outlined in Table 1. It has been informed by the Australian Flexible Learning Framework’s (2001) BECTRA 
matrix. The BECTRA matrix is an e-learning strategy that assists organisations to determine a baseline in order 
that they may improve their practice. The matrix is itself an adaptation of a performance improvement (PI) 
research tool developed by organisational change (International Society for Performance 
Improvement, 2011) . Table 3 below is an adaptation of one section of this matrix, Vision and strategic 
planning. The approach of the BECTRA matrix is unique in that staff without specific governance knowledge 
are easily able to map their organisations performance to the criteria presented within the matrix. For this reason, 
the user friendly BECTRA governance approach has been utilised for this governance capability framework.  
The framework is utilised as follows: for each aspect in the matrix, a practice selects the appropriate information 
security governance (ISG) functions applicable to the practice from the range, Initial through to Optimised. An 
ISG baseline is established after the first iteration of the matrix is complete. The framework is flexible in that a 
practice can customise it to suit their needs. The practice should aim for incremental improvement from the 
baseline until the ‘Managed’ metric, or above, for each ISG function in the matrix has been achieved. 
 
1. Strategic Alignment  
1.1 Development of an information security governance (ISG) strategy within the general practice   
Initial 
 
Work has not begun 
on developing an 
ISG strategy within 
the practice. 
Repeatable 
 
The ISG strategy is 
still in draft form. 
Defined 
 
An ISG strategy has 
been published but it 
is not yet a key 
driver for change 
within the practice. 
Managed 
 
Staff across the 
practice 
actively contribute 
to the process of 
implementing, 
updating and 
developing the ISG 
strategy. 
Optimised 
 
Aspects of the ISG 
strategy are cross-
referenced to other 
strategy and policy 
documents and is a 
key driver for 
change across the 
practice. 
1.2 Communicating the ISG strategy across the practice   
Initial 
 
No communication 
of the ISG strategy 
to staff or patients 
has taken place. 
Repeatable 
 
Staff and patients 
are largely unaware 
of any practice 
strategy for the 
development of ISG. 
Defined 
 
Communicating the 
strategy to staff and 
patients has started, 
but as yet awareness 
of the strategy is 
limited to a minority 
of staff. 
Managed 
 
Senior staff have 
taken appropriate 
opportunities to 
communicate the 
strategy and as a 
result most staff and 
some patients are 
aware of it. 
 
 
Optimised 
 
All staff and the 
majority of 
patients are aware 
of the practice’s 
ISG strategy. 
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1.3 Relationship of ISG strategy to other strategic plans 
Initial 
 
There is no 
reference to 
ISG in the practice’s 
other strategic plans. 
Repeatable 
 
There are a few 
mentions of ISG in 
the practice’s other 
strategic plans. 
Defined 
 
There is some cross-
referencing between 
the 
ISG strategy and 
other strategic plans. 
Managed 
 
There is 
comprehensive and 
clear cross-
referencing between 
the ISG strategy 
and the practice’s 
other strategic 
plans. 
Optimised 
 
The vision for the 
development of 
ISG is embedded 
in all strategy 
documents, and 
clearly contributes 
to the practice’s 
overall vision and 
goals. 
1.4 Strategic approach to the management of ISG 
Initial 
 
There is no strategic 
management of the 
ISG strategy. 
Repeatable 
 
Management of ISG 
takes place only 
within one team or 
section of the 
practice. 
Defined 
 
There are some links 
between different 
sections of the 
practice in terms of 
the management of 
ISG. 
Managed 
 
There is a strategic 
approach to the 
management of ISG 
across the whole 
practice. 
Optimised 
 
The management 
of ISG takes place 
within a strategic 
framework. There 
is strong 
leadership from 
management and 
appropriate 
delegation of 
operational IS 
decision making. 
1.6 Monitoring and reviewing the ISG implementation 
Initial  
 
No monitoring or 
reviewing activity 
has taken place. 
Repeatable  
 
Implementation of 
the ISG strategy has 
only rarely been 
monitored, reviewed 
or evaluated in any 
detail. 
Defined  
 
Some aspects of the 
ISG strategy are 
monitored and 
reviewed, but this is 
not done in a 
systematic way, 
makes no reference 
to other practice 
strategies, and does 
not involve all 
stakeholders. 
Managed  
 
The ISG strategy is 
regularly 
monitored, 
reviewed and 
evaluated in the 
context of the 
practice’s other 
policies, and in line 
with the practice’s 
goals and involves 
all stakeholders. 
Optimised 
 
The practice has a 
well established 
ISG framework 
for monitoring and 
reviewing all its 
strategies and 
policies. 
Table 3: Strategic Alignment CMM 
 
Once the practice has established a baseline, improvements in information security governance practice can be 
achieved in an ongoing and sustainable manner by addressing and actioning each area where improvements are 
needed. Further, general practices can perform a gap analysis to determine their information security governance 
goals in relation to the practices overall objectives. Once the expectation of information security performance in 
the practice is understood, it is possible to compare that expectation with the practices current level of 
information security performance. This comparison becomes the gap analysis.  
CONCLUSION 
Governance capability is linked to accountability in that staff need to be aware of, and possess the skills needed, 
to implement information security governance. Further, to be accountable for information security, general 
practices need to comply both with legal and best practice standards. In order to establish information security 
governance within the general practice, available resources must be known and constraints understood. 
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Empowering staff with the supporting mechanisms to properly perform their information security 
responsibilities thus forms the basis of their governance capability. 
The information security governance capability framework presented in this paper is the basis of ongoing 
doctoral research. The purpose and objective of the framework is to promote improvement in information 
security practice given the current threat environment. Further, the flexibility of the framework will assist 
practices in developing an information security strategy. The framework enables the practice to establish a 
baseline and raise staff awareness of information security requirements within the practice. It also creates a 
conduit for distributing responsibility and authority for information security to designated practice staff thereby 
assisting the practice manager in managing the information security function. By having an information security 
governance strategy and training staff to be aware of information assets and the need to be protected within the 
practice, staff can be given the authority to act. 
The aim of the framework is to assist practices without overly burdening them with additional work flows. 
Information security governance is a sizeable task for practices to integrate into their normal, and arguably more 
important, patient and management tasks. The framework contributes towards better security practice within the 
practice, and contributes towards cyber resilience and the protection of sensitive information. It will assist 
practice owners to meet their responsibilities for information security governance and ensure a well protected 
practice. Ultimately, it is the general practices’ themselves and the professions that will need to prioritise and 
drive these initiatives. 
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